

August 3

search going on now in the use of aids to learning (TV, teaching machines, tapes, etc.) foretells greater knowledge and greater application of the psychological principles of learning. We will probably use many of our old techniques in new ways. We will have more team teaching, more teacher helpers (professional and nonprofessional), more adult education (14 years of schooling will be common). We need more interclass visitation; we should experiment in home economics with new grouping procedures. We will have new time arrangements in our schools—a 12-month school year with rotating vacations. We should do more about the role of the unknown in teaching to help students discover and think for themselves. Yet, Edgar Dale cautions us, "In our anxiety to get on the band wagon of these new teaching techniques we do not end by learning to do better something we should not do at all."

What can you do as an individual teacher, then, to keep up and move ahead? I have five suggestions to get you started. First, you can examine critically what you are teaching now. (Miss Coon's questionnaire may help if it is still available.) Second, you can decide what changes in emphasis and content you need to make. Let me caution you to "make haste slowly" at first. Be inquiring and diagnostic. Like a doctor, use every way you know how to discover what's wrong. Guard against "the invisibility of the obvious." Third, perhaps all you need to do is to rediscover your enthusiasm for your job. For there is nothing more potent or more effective than an enthusiastic home-making teacher. It's catching, that enthusiasm. Fourth, be a little daring. Try a new method of teaching—at least once a week. Teach something (content and skill) with which you are most familiar in a new way. If you're in a rut—pull out. Someone has said that the only difference between a rut and a grave is that one is longer and the other is deeper. Use your imagination. Be an "imagineer." Fifth, make your life out of school as rewarding for you as you know how. Use your leisure (and I hear you all thinking, "What leisure?") in such a way that you feel refreshed both mentally and physically when you get back to your classes on Monday morning. Someone has said that whoever put Saturday and Sunday between Friday and Monday certainly had teachers in mind. The first move is the hardest. So I hope you will resolve to begin now.

People, ideas, and money will be needed to take us from where we are to the place we hope to reach. But the most powerful of these are ideas. These are generated and applied only as we creatively combine experience, research, imagination, and wisdom. Ideas are needed to maintain balance and perspective, too.

In closing, I'd like to tell you a short story which best illustrates what I have tried to say in a few thousand well chosen words.

The story is about Dorothy Parker who came back from a visit carrying two baby alligators, a gift from a friend. She had to leave the house almost immediately so she temporarily placed them in the bathtub. When she returned later in the evening she found a note from her maid who had been with her for many years. It read:

"DEAR MADAM: I am leaving. I cannot work in a house with alligators. I would have told you this before, but I never thought the question would come up."

What will come up in the next 20 or 30 years we do not know exactly, but we do know that there will be change. Change is a certainty for which our young people must be prepared. As teachers we must look to the past and learn to be better evaluators; we must look at the here and now and learn to become better generators; we must look to the future and become better prognosticators. These three—hindsight, insight, and foresight—can lead to a brighter future for home economics.

The Cuban Invasion—I

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. FLORENCE P. DWYER

OF NEW JERSEY

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, August 3, 1961

Mrs. DWYER. Mr. Speaker, the distinguished military correspondent of the New York Times, Mr. Hanson W. Baldwin, has written a two-part analysis of the attempted invasion of Cuba from the United States earlier this year which I believe deserves the widest possible attention. Under leave to extend my remarks in the Record, I commend the articles to our colleagues.

The first article follows:

THE CUBAN INVASION, I—WHITE HOUSE DECISIONS CITED IN STUDY OF WHY LANDING IN APRIL WAS A FAILURE

(By Hanson W. Baldwin)

The celebration, in Cuba last week deliberately emphasized the increasing strength of Premier Fidel Castro's pro-Communist state.

Part of the emphasis represents propaganda, but there is some truth behind the emboldened claims. About 3 months after the United States-sponsored abortive invasion of Cuba, Dr. Castro's regime is stronger than it has ever been, physically and in prestige.

In April, when 1,500 to 1,600 anti-Castro Cubans, with United States support, attempted to overthrow the Cuban Government, Havana had only 9 operational military aircraft, all propeller-driven, except 3 jet powered T-33 trainers that had been armed. The Cuban militia, then equipped with Czechoslovak and Russian small arms, about 50 Russian tanks and self-propelled guns and small amounts of field artillery, was impressive in quantity but not in quality.

About 200,000 men and women had been armed, but most of these were ill-disciplined and sparsely trained, undependable against a good military force. About 15,000 to 20,000 regular army and militiamen had received more training and could be termed a "hard core," although their combat effectiveness and dependability were open to question. There was, in April, a Cuban anti-Castro underground, and about 2,000 guerrillas scattered in the mountains all over Cuba.

Today, with the victory at the Bay of Pigs behind them, the Cuban armed forces are far more confident, less likely to defect, better armed and trained. Between 20 and 30 Soviet Mig-17 jet fighters have been delivered to Cuba and are now in operation. Heavy crates, which may contain additional disassembled planes, have been seen. Some Cuban pilots have returned from jet training in Czechoslovakia. More arms and equipment for ground troops have arrived in Cuba from Communist countries.

GUERRILLAS ARE INACTIVE

The underground has been virtually quiescent; the guerrillas have been inactive; Dr. Castro's opposition is disorganized and downcast. The overthrow of Dr. Castro's government would be far more difficult today, even if U.S. forces were sent into the island, than it would have been 3 months ago. And the U.S. Government apparently has no plan for eliminating what many observers have called the cancer of communism in Cuba.

The April invasion has been widely ridiculed since its failure, and the Central Intelligence Agency and the Joint Chiefs of Staff have been made the principal whipping boys.

The impossibility of overthrowing Dr. Castro with 1,500 to 1,600 men appears self-evident; the rhetorical question, "How could anyone be so stupid?" has been a popular one around Washington in the last 3 months. Yet the operation in its original concepts was not as stupid as it had been made to appear and the responsibility for the mistakes appears to be widely distributed.

The story of the Cuban venture, pieced together from talks with many Government officials and from other sources, postulates many lessons of major importance in the Berlin crisis.

PLANNING STARTED IN 1960

Planning for the Cuban assault started in the late spring of 1960, when former President Dwight D. Eisenhower authorized the Central Intelligence Agency to organize, train, and equip anti-Castro Cuban refugees. Allen W. Dulles, Director of the CIA, and his Deputy for Operations, Richard M. Bissell, initiated the secret operation. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and the military were not initially given any details of the plans for employment of the Cuban refugees, but as their training progressed the Pentagon was asked to assign officers, training cadres, weapons and equipment to the CIA.

The plan, as it developed under the Eisenhower, and later the Kennedy administration, did not, contrary to published reports, commit U.S. Armed Forces to support of the Cuban refugees in actual military operations. Such a commitment was considered but never, as far as can be learned, officially approved, although it was not publicly and finally disapproved until a few days before the landing.

The original Eisenhower planning contemplated one or more series of relatively small landings to reinforce the anti-Castro guerrillas in the hills. Last November 30 had been, tentatively, one of the target dates for the invasion, but the impending change in administration as a result of the November elections forced its postponement.

About December, the character of the operation appears to have changed from dispersed guerrilla landings to the establishment of one beachhead. If the beachhead appeared to be firmly established, a Cuban government in exile could be flown in, and all Cubans would then be called upon to join in the revolt against Dr. Castro. Whether the United States would recognize this government and the kind and degree of support it might give it were apparently left open.

INVASION SITE SHIFTED

After the Kennedy Administration took office other changes were made.

The Bay of Pigs, closer to Havana but seventy-five miles from the nearest concentration of guerrillas in the Escambré Mountains, was substituted for another suggested beach, less than 100 miles to the east.

Perhaps more important, the preparations for the operation became so big and so obvious that it was no longer secret. Published stories about the refugee training camps in Guatemala and preparations in Florida plus the expectation that Soviet MIG-17's, now in Cuba, would soon arrive increased pressure on the administration for quick action and also rallied, within the administration, the opposition to any U.S.-sponsored intervention.

On April 12, 5 days before the invasion at the Bay of Pigs, Cuba, President Kennedy announced at a press conference that U.S. armed forces would "in no circumstances" be used to overthrow Dr. Castro.

THE INVASION FORCE

The Kennedy announcement meant that about 1,600 Cuban refugees, supported by 16 American-built B-26 propeller-driven light bombers based in Central America, transported by old U.S. merchant ships procured with U.S. funds, armed with Amer-

a rarity. Do we really want that in America?" he asks. "Or do we prefer what the Bonn government has set up—a system of examinations through which the decision to go to the university, or not to go, is firmly made when a child is 10 years old? The result: Only 1 out of 20 pupils makes the grade."

How do you think these ideas affect us in home economics? We must think about it if we are to remain in the mainstream of educational progress.

Critics seem to forget that it is essential that faultfinding be preceded by factfinding. Alice was right when she told the King of Hearts that it was "nonsense to consider the verdict before considering the evidence."

I believe the foundation to our future growth and development in home economics rests with our philosophy. For what we believe affects everything that we think and say and do. What do you believe the role of home economics is in education and in the world of the future? Remember if it is really a sound philosophy, the basic ideas will not change much although the world will change rapidly. It will have a built-in flexibility which will keep us abreast and in certain instances, ahead of the times. We cannot become static nor fall into a pattern of prefabricated judgments. Remember the bed of Procrustes. In days of old, Bulfinch tells us, "evildoers and monsters oppressed the country." And prominent among these was a giant called Procrustes, or the Stretcher. He had an iron bedstead on which he used to tie all travelers who fell into his hands. If they were shorter than the bed, he stretched their limbs to make them fit it. If they were longer than the bed, he lopped off a portion."

One of the most basic questions often asked is this. How can we educate today's young people for the future in which they will live but that we cannot predict?

Laura Zerbes has one of the finest answers I've been able to find. "Anthropologists tell us that we can and must educate for adaptability, resourcefulness, flexibility, and readiness to adjust, but also for: steadfastness to human values, creativity and self-reliance. We must try to develop intercultural understanding and a concern for the common good. In a scientific age we should try to reduce strains and tensions, hunger caused by want, deprivation and denial, reaction and regression."

In other words, build the human value—and this is our greatest area of strength.

Incidentally, one of the books which every teacher should read if she wants to be more creative and develop the creative potential in her students is "Creative Power" by Hughes Mearns.

You will need to be quite sure in your own mind what it is you really believe about home economics in order to face the exciting, exacting future.

What would it be like, this world in the next decades? What kind of education will we need? What kind of jobs must our children make themselves ready to fill? What new opportunities will they face? What kind of people must they be to cope with the future's problems? The answers to such questions should be guiding what we do now, everyday, as well as give direction to our plans for the future.

Many changes are predictable. The influences which will drastically affect our future are all around us. As John Dewey said, "The future surrounds the present like a halo." Here are a few of the most important issues and influences; think about implications for home economics in these:

First and foremost is the problem of peace; without peace there will be no future for any of us. This is an issue none of us can evade. If we want peace we must make sure that our representatives in Government know our representatives in government know where we stand.

Our relations with other peoples of the world cannot be trusted to cultural and intellectual pigmies. We need education for all children and must fight to get and be willing to pay for the schools we obviously need. H. G. Wells once said, "Human history becomes more and more a race between education and disaster." It was never more true than it is today. Truly the future is in our hands. This is a time of crisis. The Chinese write the word "crisis" with two characters. One stands for danger and the other for opportunity. Both danger and opportunity confront us.

Margaret Mead says that we built our country on the assumption that anybody can be President, but that we need now to act as if any of our children might reach the moon. We must be ready for the world in which the moon and outer space will be explored. She makes some interesting observations about the kind of world we are even now beginning to experience, where many of our daily processes will include machine links. Such aspects of everyday life as buying a ticket, cashing a check, applying for a job, getting into college, passing an exam, ordering a spare part, will depend on the accuracy with which someone turns a screw or punches a hole in an IBM card. It seems to me that life will become increasingly like a parachute jump—something that has to be done right the first time.

Thomas Watson, Jr. ("Mr. Automation" himself), president of IBM, has said, "Man has made some machines that can answer questions provided the facts are previously stored in them; he will never be able to make a machine that will ask questions. The ability to ask the right questions is more than half the battle of finding the right answer." We must increasingly be like the mother who daily asked her son (who inevitably became a scientist), "Did you ask any good questions today?"

I've tried to find some clues to the future in today's world. How they will affect us in home economics I hope you will figure out for yourselves.

In housing these are some features which may be of interest: add or take-away-a-room feature; adjustable and movable interior walls; circular rooms; new equipment and materials; move-a-house (secondhand houses will be sold for use somewhere else, or it will be possible to take your old home to a new job location). Other factors which will affect housing include decentralization of industry into satellite towns and smaller cities, use of revolutionary high-speed transportation, such as helicopters and monorail trains. (Will we have helicopter schoolbuses) Perhaps commuting will be eliminated through a rearrangement of business and factory procedures—instant communications will make possible business offices in the suburbs, a core of "contact men" in the city itself, and factories in autonomous suburbs. Teams of planners for homes of the future will include "imaginers" and engineers, architects, home economists, psychologists, materials technologists, production and mechanical engineers, interior decorators, landscape architects, and acoustical experts.

New kitchen concepts will replace current classic work centers, because of further advances in the preparation and packaging of foods and the effects of improvements on the buying habits and food preparation. Cooking will be faster and more automatic and will require fewer utensils. Toting and carrying will be taken over by automatic conveyor systems.

The laundry will be a completely automatic and sanitary unit. Easy-care fabrics and noniron clothing will be cleaned in appliances using ultrasonic soundwaves. We will have disposable clothing sold at low prices for children, garage men, factory workers, housewives, and home handymen.

As for food, no pill will ever substitute for meals, for food is tied in too closely with the joy of living. We will have better ways to process and package foods to retain nutrients and cut waste: preservation by ionizing radiation to kill microbes; dehydration by "freeze drying" (food dehydrated by microwave energy in below-freezing vacuum, put in airtight cans where they will keep for years; to use, simply immerse in water). Research may develop "fish farms" for easier, better source of protein.

There will be fabulous changes in the marketing and distribution of foods. Regional dishes and foreign foods will be made available on a worldwide scale. The number and kinds of special foods for the sick and for older people will increase. One of the innovations at the supermarket will be a home economist as one of the regular employees to stand by and help plan meals and parties.

Nutrition research has many exciting possibilities. One is the discovery that food is closely related to brain metabolism and mental health. Will the application of greater nutritional knowledge to the study of body chemistry mean freedom from certain mental disorders current today? Even now the B vitamins are being used to treat psychogenic symptoms of depression, anxiety, and extreme sensitivity to noise and light.

Does this mean we will have no more home cooking? On the contrary, with increased leisure and longer weekends there may be a rebirth of home cooking. Creative cooks will enjoy cooking, and others who do not care about cooking will be able to eat better because they can buy pre-prepared foods. I believe there will be many more men who will cook.

What changes does this mean for us in home economics? Our houses may become thermoelectric, ultrasonic, and electronic, and air conditioned from a central plant like our gas and electricity is now, and much of the equipment will be truly automatic (stoves that can be turned on and off by dialing the instructions from a phone booth). All of this may be paid for "on the cuff" through new concepts of financing which include monthly payments that increase as the family income goes up, for example. How will this affect the content and methods of teaching?

Although I have not had access to Miss Coon's report of her study about what we are now teaching in our secondary schools in home economics, I did hear a report of her findings at the North Atlantic Regional Conference. And, if what the teachers themselves have told her is true, we are way behind the times even now. In general, the teachers said they gave clothing and foods each one-third of the class time they had at their disposal. The other third was devoted to child development, family relations, home management, consumer education, housing and family health.

If we look at the way families are living, even today, and most certainly if we want to keep up with their way of life in the future, this implies that we must teach a lot more and better management in all areas. We must teach more consumer education and increase our offerings in home and family living, child development and problems of parenthood. In management, it is my hope that along with basic principles we learn more about, and use more often, the notion of "intelligent neglect", to avoid sterile stereotypes of management most people have now.

In teaching, traditional ways of teaching and learning will be greatly changed if current experiments and innovations continue to prove their worth. The chores associated with teaching will be lessened. Records will be kept through automation devices and techniques, for example. The amount of re-

The Cuban Invasion—II

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. FLORENCE P. DWYER

OF NEW JERSEY

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, August 3, 1961

Mrs. DWYER. Mr. Speaker, under leave to extend my remarks in the RECORD, I include the second article in a two-part series written by the New York Times correspondent, Mr. Hanson W. Baldwin, and published by the Times in its issues of July 31 and August 1.

The second article follows:

THE CUBAN INVASION, II—REBELS' DEFEAT IS ASCRIBED TO ERRORS IN PLAN AND EXECUTION IN WASHINGTON

(By Hanson W. Baldwin)

The invasion of Cuba last April, it is now clear, was lost in Washington.

The small invading force was adjudged shortly before the operation. In a written report submitted by a Colonel Hawkins of the Marine Corps, to be battleworthy and comparatively almost as well equipped as a similar U.S. unit. This judgment had some effect in Washington and, observers contend, was borne out by the actual fighting.

Despite the casualty statistics (some 1,200 of the 1,500 to 1,600 captured), the invaders gave a good account of themselves. Most sources agree that the refugees fought well until their ammunition ran out, that they inflicted more casualties on Fidel Castro's forces than he had conceded, and that the Cuban militia in the area of the landing almost immediately defected in scores to the invaders' side only to defect back again to Dr. Castro after the failure of the invasion became obvious.

Like the British and French invasion of Port Said during the Suez crisis of 1956, the Cuban operational plans and their implementation were watered down and the invasion was doomed by nonmilitary considerations.

The errors made and the blame for them are widespread.

ERRORS LAID TO KENNEDY

President Kennedy, new to supreme power, showed uncertainty in one of his first tests as Commander in Chief and met the opposing opinions of his advisers by compromise instead of clear-cut decision. His announcement a few days before the invasion that "In no circumstances" would U.S. Armed Forces be used to overthrow the Cuban Government should have led to cancellation, or major revision of the operation, for use of the U.S. Armed Forces was the one factor that could absolutely insure success.

Similarly, the cancellation of the preinvasion air strike—a key to the achievement of air superiority, a stipulated precondition for success—was the final counterweight against the invaders.

But it is also true that the President inherited the Cuban problem and a plan that had grown too big, physically and because of its political implications, for the Central Intelligence Agency.

In effect, everybody had a hand in the Cuban venture and yet nobody was clearly in charge. It was bureaucracy at its worst, with the right hand sometimes not knowing (as in the case of Adlai E. Stevenson at the United Nations) what the left hand was doing.

The close and careful liaison between political and military planning that is absolutely essential to strategic success was lacking.

In fact, neither the military nor the State Department was the primary planner or executor of the Cuban invasion.

The invasion, partly because the original plan just grew and expanded, partly in the interests of security and secrecy (which could not possibly be maintained when the operation became so large), was primarily the baby of the Central Intelligence Agency. The Agency made mistakes in planning, execution and judgment. Allen W. Dulles, its Director, and Richard M. Bissell, the Deputy for Plans and Operations and in direct charge of the Cuban affair, will probably bear the burden of failure by resigning their offices.

FAILURES OF JOINT CHIEFS

The Joint Chiefs of Staff made mistakes in failing to be explicit and emphatic—in not pounding the table enough and in failing to commit all their ideas and viewpoints to paper. (In the interests of secrecy much of the Cuban planning and direction was oral.)

The White House believes the military judgments were faulty and the studies inadequate, but Pentagon sources deny this.

The State Department and other advisers bear responsibility for contributing to confusion and defeat by insisting upon legalisms that the guilty conscience of a democracy so often demands when it resorts to naked force.

McGeorge Bundy, a Presidential assistant, shares and manfully has accepted blame for insufficiently emphasizing to the President the dangerous and negative aspects of the operation. And the President himself has assumed full responsibility for the failure.

But the assessment of fault, although essential to analysis, is far less important than the lessons learned.

The primary lesson is the importance of the principle of the objective, as it is known in military parlance, or in slang terms, "keeping your eye on the ball."

The original objective was the overthrow of Dr. Castro. Whether this was an adequate political objective, or whether there should have been another constructive long-term goal is open to question. But even this original objective was rendered impossible of accomplishment before the assault started.

A considered statement of what one is trying to accomplish, with political, military, and economic factors all carefully weighed, is the essential first step for any operation.

The operational plan must be capable of accomplishing this objective. In the Cuban invasion the objective itself seems to have become fuzzy, and the invasion plan as actually modified in execution could not possibly have accomplished the overthrow of Dr. Castro.

NEED FOR U.S. FORCES

The political and military disadvantages of any given plan must be weighed against the advantages obtained by accomplishment of the objective.

The disadvantages of the Cuban invasion were so great that either it had to succeed or it should never have been attempted. To insure success, the support of U.S. Armed Forces was essential, yet this was ruled out before the start of the operation.

The world respects power successfully used to accomplish national objectives. A successful invasion of Cuba and the overthrow of Dr. Castro backed by the United States would probably have overbalanced the adverse political, legal, and moral effects of our open intervention in Cuban affairs.

As it was, we suffered all the opprobrium that attaches to failure, and all the psychological and political disadvantages associated with the term "Yankee imperialism." And our backing of the Cuban refugees was

ican equipment and trained by American cadres but without the help of U.S. armed forces, would attempt to establish a beachhead in Cuba.

A second decision of major importance was made by the White House just a short time before the invaders actually landed at the Bay of Pigs on April 17. Two days before the invasion, preliminary air strikes were flown by a few B-26's piloted by Cuban refugee fliers, against some of Dr. Castro's airfields. The planes were based on Central America and landed in Florida after their mission.

The United States asserted these planes were flown from Cuban airfields by defecting pilots. A storm arose in the United Nations, and Adlai E. Stevenson, the U.S. delegate, who had not been informed fully of our Cuban plans, declared publicly with great emphasis that the planes came from Cuba. He was hastily informed by Washington of his mistake.

The invasion force left as scheduled from Central America, and was escorted at sea by U.S. Navy destroyers, with an aircraft carrier in the background. The naval vessels had orders to stay outside the Cuban 3-mile limit, but to be prepared for anything.

On the night and early morning of the invasion a key airstrike, flown by Cuban refugee pilots in B-26's, was scheduled to bomb the nine Cuban planes spotted in known positions on Cuban airfields. A few hours before the invasion was scheduled, while the ships were nearing the Bay of Pigs beaches, the airstrike was canceled by the White House.

The cancellation was apparently the result of representations by Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and through him by Mr. Stevenson. Both of them were worried by the effect of a second air strike from Central America upon opinion in the United Nations and Latin America. The President ordered the CIA to cancel the strike, but, according to an administration spokesman, specified that the CIA had the right to appeal to the President and left the possibility of reversal open. The appeal was not made, according to the spokesman.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff were not aware of the cancellation of this key airstrike until after the beachhead had actually been established, according to Government sources.

By this time much of the damage had been done, for Dr. Castro's planes, alerted by the actual landings, were in the air attacking the invading ships, and were dispersed after their sorties to new airfields. Contrary to general opinion, the actual landings achieved, as Dr. Castro has since conceded, a tactical surprise, much as the Allied landings on the coast of Normandy in World War II achieved a tactical surprise. Dr. Castro knew the invasion was coming; it could not be a strategic surprise. But he did not know where or when.

After the landing, the Cuban refugee pilots were permitted to fly close support missions from Central America but with orders to touch down first at the Bay of Pigs airstrip (within the beachhead) to provide the verisimilitude of legality. But it was too late. The nine Cuban planes sank two of the Cuban refugees' ships before communications equipment and ammunition had been unloaded. And the three T-33 jet trainers, which had been armed by Dr. Castro, played havoc with the slow B-26's.

U.S. Navy pilots, flying in fast jet attack planes off the beachhead, armed and ready for action in case they should be ordered to intervene, saw the end of the invasion from the air as Cuban tanks rumbled down the roads. The invaders had run out of ammunition; there was nothing to do but surrender.

so thinly disguised that it immediately exposed Washington to the same charges we would have faced had U.S. Armed Forces been employed.

The second great lesson of Cuba is the importance of tight policy control, direction and management of any venture involving the application of military power, no matter how small.

This control and management must center in the President as Commander in Chief; each President will use the machinery of Government differently, but history has shown that ordered discussions and debates and staff work, and recorded decisions may bring new insight and prevent major mistakes. These procedures were largely lacking in the Kennedy administration prior to the time of the Cuban invasion.

MISTAKES OF THE CIA

A third lesson of Cuba is that no military or paramilitary operation should be under the control of the Central Intelligence Agency if it is of such a size and character that it is bound to become overt or open, rather than covert or secret. Operations of the size of the Cuban invasion should be managed by the Defense Department, which is far better staffed and has more expert military knowledge than the CIA.

Another lesson is the necessity of keeping all secret intelligence activities and operations under constant top-echelon surveillance and review. Machinery for a critical and objective analysis of all such efforts should be strengthened by the creation of a joint congressional watchdog committee, and by a careful supervision of the CIA by the National Security Council and other White House staff agencies.

But the Cuban failure offers no valid reason for dismembering the CIA, or for changing its name. Intelligence operations of many different kinds—black or concealed radio, propaganda, sabotage and so on—must be conducted by some agency of Government. Most of these do not properly fit into the Pentagon, except, of course, when the operation assumes a character distinctly military and a size and complexity that make the Pentagon the obvious place to handle it.

But specialized and distinctive secret operations of various sorts are best handled by some separate, centralized agency. There is no magic in separating these specialized operations from intelligence-gathering collection and evaluation; in fact the two must work hand in hand.

One man, as Mr. Dulles now does, could well head both, but the organization must provide, as CIA now does, for separate but coordinated efforts in secret operations and in intelligence.

LESSON FOR INTELLIGENCE

The CIA, whether we like it or not, is an inevitable part of the modern machinery for national survival in the nuclear age. It has made mistakes in the past and will again in the future. But it has also had great successes in the past, as in the U-2 operation. It must be improved, not made a scapegoat. It probably employs too many people and its administrative machinery could be considerably improved.

Power—the power of secret information—is insidious, and some of CIA's personnel need to relearn the lesson of humility and of human failure. But the CIA is here to stay.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff similarly is a key body in our national security machinery. They, too, have human weaknesses, and they, too, have made mistakes. But the principles they embody—differing military approaches to the same military problem; the right of dissent; collective wisdom as opposed to the judgments of a single military mind—are essential in the future as they have been in the past.

In sum, the failure of Cuba was a failure of bureaucracy, but as in all failures it was essentially a failure of men rather than of organization.

Rear Adm. H. E. Eccles, retired, comments in "Notes on the Cuban Crisis," a paper prepared under the sponsorship of the George Washington University Logistics Research project, that "somehow or other there seemed to be a complete divorce between the national policy and the power allotted to the task at hand."

He points out that "in great matters of state, the President simply cannot afford to leave these vital three (analysis of objectives, clear conceptual unity and careful followup) to his subordinates. The price of failure or of mediocre execution is too great."

And Admiral Eccles stresses that the Cuban venture again emphasizes that in "the protracted conflict with the totalitarian concept the fate of the free society will be determined much more by the understanding of human emotion and the exercise of intellectual power and moral values than by technological factors."

Glastonbury Miss Heads Girls' Nation

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. EMILIO Q. DADDARIO

OF CONNECTICUT

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Monday, July 10, 1961

Mr. DADDARIO. Mr. Speaker, it is with a great deal of pride that I learned earlier this week that a young lady from my district, Miss Susan MacDonald, was elected president of Girls' Nation. I offer for the Record news stories that appeared in the Hartford Times and the Hartford Courant about this outstanding and talented girl.

[From the Hartford Times]

MAY MEET FAMOUS COUNTERPART: AREA LASS HEADS GIRLS' NATION

A 17-year-old South Glastonbury girl was elected president of Girls' Nation Tuesday in Washington, D.C.

Susan L. MacDonald, daughter of Mr. and Mrs. Berton A. MacDonald, of 1073 Main Street, South Glastonbury, won the 1961 election on a platform supporting intensive civil defense training.

Elected vice president was her running mate, Deborah Rosen, of Orangeburg, S.C. Both girls campaigned on the Nationalist Party ticket to defeat opposing Federalist candidates from Mississippi and Idaho.

Earlier, Susan had been chosen majority floor leader of the Girls Nation senate at the convention, sponsored by the American Legion Auxiliary.

The new presidential post may also win her a chance to meet President Kennedy Friday as Girls Nation delegates meet their counterparts in the National Government.

Susan, a senior this fall at Glastonbury High School, was chosen by her classmates to attend Laurel Girls State in Storrs and there won the chance to go on to Girls Nation.

At the State convention, she was also voted the outstanding girl and received the Joan Connell Memorial Award.

Susan, who wants to go into foreign relations work, will be president of her high school student council this fall. She has been active in scouting and was a leader this summer at the Girl Scout day camp in Glastonbury.

Connecticut's second delegate to the annual convention is Nancy L. Thompson, of 77 Golf Street, Newington.

Girls Nation, now in its 15th year, is held on the campus of American University in Washington. Nearly 100 delegates from 48 States and 2 U.S. territories are attending. Sessions will end Friday and girls will head home Saturday.

[From the Hartford Courant]

GLASTONBURY MISS HEADS GIRLS NATION

Susan L. MacDonald, 17, of Glastonbury, won the 1961 presidency of Girls Nation Tuesday in Washington, D.C.

Campaigning hard for civil defense on the Nationalist Party ticket, she defeated the Federalist candidate, Judy Simono, of Vicksburg, Miss.

Also elected with Susan was her running mate, Deborah Rosen, of Orangeburg, S.C., is vice president.

In a telephone conversation with her mother late Tuesday night, Susan said she was presented with roses before a reviewing stand at ceremonies held at Fort Myer, Va.

The defeated candidate during the same phone call told Mrs. MacDonald that Susan was a terrific person.

Susan is the daughter of Mr. and Mrs. Berton A. MacDonald, of 1073 Main Street, Glastonbury, and is one of more than 100 delegates meeting on the campus of American University for a week of mock-Government sessions.

Sponsored by the American Legion Auxiliary, Girls Nation is now in its 15th year. The delegates form parties, hold elections, establish a model government, and meet members of the U.S. Government.

Susan wrote her parents Sunday after her first airplane ride, which she said was bumpy, and said she was rooming in a modern dormitory with a girl from Nebraska. She also told her parents she had her picture taken with the Air Force Bagpipe Band.

Susan and Nancy Thompson, of Newington, were selected from Laurel Girls State, held in Storrs earlier in July, to be the Connecticut representatives.

At Girls State, Susan presented her party's platform to the assembly. She was also elected the outstanding girl by the other girls, and received the Joan Connell Memorial Award.

A junior in Glastonbury High School, Susan was chosen by her class to go to Girls State. The Glastonbury American Legion Auxiliary sponsored her trip to Storrs. The State auxiliary makes the trip to Washington possible.

Susan, who will be president of the high school student council this fall, wants to go into foreign relations.

She is active in girl scouting and was a leader at the Girl Scout day camp in Glastonbury this summer.

The sessions end Saturday morning.

American Nazi Party

EXTENSION OF REMARKS

OF

HON. SEYMOUR HALPERN

OF NEW YORK

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

Thursday, August 3, 1961

Mr. HALPERN. Mr. Speaker, yesterday I called on the Secretary of Defense to look into reports that a civilian employee of the Department, a strategic technician, has figured in the notoriety of the American Nazi Party of George